Produced by: Mohsin Shaikh
Turkey supplies 70% of India’s marble imports, valued at ₹2,500–3,000 crore annually. A boycott would necessitate supply shifts to Italy, Iran, and Egypt, which are viable but would require scaling up.
Turkish apples, forming a ₹1,000–1,200 crore seasonal market, are already being substituted with imports from Iran and New Zealand, alongside domestic production. Some price adjustments have occurred, but alternatives exist.
Turkish firms like Çelebi Aviation operate ground handling at key Indian airports. Replacing them would involve operational shifts but remains within India’s capabilities through local or alternative international partners.
Around 300,000 Indian tourists visited Turkey in 2024. A boycott would redirect this outbound tourism spend (~₹3,000–₹4,000 crore) to other destinations, with limited long-term impact on India’s travel industry.
The canceled $2.3 billion shipbuilding deal is part of broader India-Turkey economic ties. Further disengagement would involve phasing out Turkish contractors, with feasible replacements through domestic and global players.
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India’s exports to Turkey account for 1.5% of total exports (~$6.65 billion). Engineering goods, chemicals, and textiles would be most affected. Diversification to other markets is possible but could take adjustment time.
Turkey's share in India's imports is 0.5% (~$3.78 billion). Items like marble, fruits, and certain chemicals would need alternative sourcing, which is manageable with existing global supply chains.
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Turkish FDI in India stands at ~$210–227 million, while Indian FDI in Turkey ranges between $126–200 million. These are moderate figures, limiting systemic financial exposure for both sides.
A boycott would align with India's strategic recalibrations but could influence Turkey’s diplomatic posture in multilateral platforms. India would weigh this against its broader regional and global priorities.