Bangladesh-Pakistan ties: What Dhaka’s interest in Saudi-Türkiye defence pact means for India
The Ministry of External Affairs has said it is closely following developments surrounding the Pakistan-Saudi Arabia-Türkiye defence arrangement and is examining their implications for India's national security, regional peace and stability.
- Aug 22, 2026,
- Updated Aug 22, 2026 4:57 PM IST
For more than five decades, Bangladesh’s relationship with Pakistan was shaped by the trauma of the 1971 Liberation War, when East Pakistan broke away after a brutal conflict with the Pakistani military.
Now, the two countries are moving closer again — and Dhaka is signalling that it could potentially join a defence framework involving Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye.
The development marks a striking shift in South Asian geopolitics. It also presents a new challenge for India, which has traditionally enjoyed much closer strategic and security ties with Bangladesh than Pakistan has.
What has Bangladesh said?
Humayun Kabir, foreign affairs adviser to Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman, has said Dhaka has a positive approach towards potentially joining an economic or defence framework involving Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye.
Kabir stressed that Bangladesh's policy is guided by a “Bangladesh First” approach and that Dhaka is pursuing a balanced foreign policy based on national interests. He also said Bangladesh was strengthening its working relationship with Pakistan, particularly in trade and people-to-people connectivity.
The statement does not mean Bangladesh has formally joined the pact. Rather, Dhaka has indicated that it is open to the possibility.
India's response has been cautious. The Ministry of External Affairs has said it is closely following developments surrounding the Pakistan-Saudi Arabia-Türkiye defence arrangement and is examining their implications for India's national security, regional peace and stability.
What is the Mecca Pact?
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye have signed a joint defence agreement designed around collective deterrence. Under the arrangement, an armed attack against one of the three countries would be regarded as an attack against all three.
The pact brings together Saudi Arabia's financial and energy weight, Türkiye's military capabilities and Pakistan's nuclear-armed military.
For Bangladesh, joining such a framework would therefore be considerably more consequential than simply expanding bilateral relations with Pakistan.
Why is Bangladesh warming up to Pakistan?
The biggest reason is the transformation of Bangladesh's foreign policy since Sheikh Hasina's ouster in 2024. Under Hasina, Dhaka developed exceptionally close relations with New Delhi, covering trade, infrastructure, connectivity and security.
Her departure changed that equation. At the same time, Bangladesh's previously strained relationship with Pakistan began improving. The rapprochement has moved beyond political statements.
Bangladesh and Pakistan have increased diplomatic engagement, explored greater trade, eased some travel restrictions and expanded cultural and educational exchanges. Military contacts have also increased, with senior officials discussing security cooperation, training, exercises and arms trade.
Bangladesh has also shown interest in Pakistan-China jointly developed JF-17 fighter aircraft. In other words, this is not simply about historical reconciliation. Dhaka is trying to diversify its strategic options.
But what about 1971?
That is what makes the shift particularly striking. Bangladesh was formerly East Pakistan. Political, linguistic and economic tensions between East and West Pakistan culminated in the 1971 Liberation War.
The Pakistani military's campaign in what was then East Pakistan resulted in mass killings and widespread atrocities before Bangladesh emerged as an independent country.
Those memories have not disappeared. The legacy of the 1971 war, including the question of Pakistan's failure to formally apologise for the atrocities, continues to influence opinion in Bangladesh.
Yet geopolitics rarely remains frozen by history. For today's Bangladesh, economic interests, defence modernisation, access to new partners and strategic autonomy may increasingly outweigh the old diplomatic barriers.
That does not erase 1971. It shows that Bangladesh's current leadership is willing to separate historical grievances from present-day state interests.
Why should India be concerned?
The immediate concern is geography. Bangladesh shares a long border with India and sits at the eastern edge of the Indian subcontinent. Pakistan, meanwhile, is India's principal military rival in the west.
If Dhaka were to enter a formal defence arrangement involving Pakistan, India's strategic environment could become more complicated.
1. Pakistan could gain a new strategic opening: For decades, India's geographic position effectively limited Pakistan's ability to exert influence on Bangladesh. A deeper Pakistan-Bangladesh military relationship could change that. It could give Islamabad greater access to Bangladesh's defence establishment, military exchanges and potentially the country's strategic geography.
2. China's role could become more important: Pakistan and Bangladesh already have significant defence relationships with China. A closer Pakistan-Bangladesh security relationship could therefore create an overlapping network involving China, Pakistan and Bangladesh. That does not automatically mean a formal anti-India bloc. But it could reduce India's strategic influence in its immediate eastern neighbourhood.
3. The maritime dimension matters: Bangladesh's location gives it access to the Bay of Bengal and the wider Indian Ocean. Pakistan and Türkiye have also been discussing maritime defence cooperation, while Saudi Arabia has been working on protecting regional shipping and energy routes. A Bangladesh connection could eventually add a maritime dimension to the emerging security network.
For India, which regards the Bay of Bengal as critical to its eastern maritime strategy, this would merit close monitoring.
Does this mean Bangladesh is becoming a headache for India? Not yet.
Bangladesh has repeatedly emphasised a policy of strategic balancing rather than choosing one major power over another. The current government is simultaneously trying to maintain working relations with India, Pakistan, China, Saudi Arabia and other partners.
India-Bangladesh ties are already under strain
The timing is significant. Relations between New Delhi and Dhaka have deteriorated since Hasina's removal. Bangladesh has sought her extradition from India, while New Delhi has been dealing with the political and security consequences of her presence in India.
At the same time, both countries have been discussing ways to repair ties. Against this backdrop, Dhaka's openness to a Pakistan-linked defence framework sends a clear strategic message: Bangladesh does not want its foreign policy to be dependent on any single neighbour.
The most important change may not be Bangladesh joining the Mecca Pact itself. It is the emergence of a new South Asian reality in which old alignments are being reconsidered.
For more than five decades, Bangladesh’s relationship with Pakistan was shaped by the trauma of the 1971 Liberation War, when East Pakistan broke away after a brutal conflict with the Pakistani military.
Now, the two countries are moving closer again — and Dhaka is signalling that it could potentially join a defence framework involving Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye.
The development marks a striking shift in South Asian geopolitics. It also presents a new challenge for India, which has traditionally enjoyed much closer strategic and security ties with Bangladesh than Pakistan has.
What has Bangladesh said?
Humayun Kabir, foreign affairs adviser to Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman, has said Dhaka has a positive approach towards potentially joining an economic or defence framework involving Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye.
Kabir stressed that Bangladesh's policy is guided by a “Bangladesh First” approach and that Dhaka is pursuing a balanced foreign policy based on national interests. He also said Bangladesh was strengthening its working relationship with Pakistan, particularly in trade and people-to-people connectivity.
The statement does not mean Bangladesh has formally joined the pact. Rather, Dhaka has indicated that it is open to the possibility.
India's response has been cautious. The Ministry of External Affairs has said it is closely following developments surrounding the Pakistan-Saudi Arabia-Türkiye defence arrangement and is examining their implications for India's national security, regional peace and stability.
What is the Mecca Pact?
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye have signed a joint defence agreement designed around collective deterrence. Under the arrangement, an armed attack against one of the three countries would be regarded as an attack against all three.
The pact brings together Saudi Arabia's financial and energy weight, Türkiye's military capabilities and Pakistan's nuclear-armed military.
For Bangladesh, joining such a framework would therefore be considerably more consequential than simply expanding bilateral relations with Pakistan.
Why is Bangladesh warming up to Pakistan?
The biggest reason is the transformation of Bangladesh's foreign policy since Sheikh Hasina's ouster in 2024. Under Hasina, Dhaka developed exceptionally close relations with New Delhi, covering trade, infrastructure, connectivity and security.
Her departure changed that equation. At the same time, Bangladesh's previously strained relationship with Pakistan began improving. The rapprochement has moved beyond political statements.
Bangladesh and Pakistan have increased diplomatic engagement, explored greater trade, eased some travel restrictions and expanded cultural and educational exchanges. Military contacts have also increased, with senior officials discussing security cooperation, training, exercises and arms trade.
Bangladesh has also shown interest in Pakistan-China jointly developed JF-17 fighter aircraft. In other words, this is not simply about historical reconciliation. Dhaka is trying to diversify its strategic options.
But what about 1971?
That is what makes the shift particularly striking. Bangladesh was formerly East Pakistan. Political, linguistic and economic tensions between East and West Pakistan culminated in the 1971 Liberation War.
The Pakistani military's campaign in what was then East Pakistan resulted in mass killings and widespread atrocities before Bangladesh emerged as an independent country.
Those memories have not disappeared. The legacy of the 1971 war, including the question of Pakistan's failure to formally apologise for the atrocities, continues to influence opinion in Bangladesh.
Yet geopolitics rarely remains frozen by history. For today's Bangladesh, economic interests, defence modernisation, access to new partners and strategic autonomy may increasingly outweigh the old diplomatic barriers.
That does not erase 1971. It shows that Bangladesh's current leadership is willing to separate historical grievances from present-day state interests.
Why should India be concerned?
The immediate concern is geography. Bangladesh shares a long border with India and sits at the eastern edge of the Indian subcontinent. Pakistan, meanwhile, is India's principal military rival in the west.
If Dhaka were to enter a formal defence arrangement involving Pakistan, India's strategic environment could become more complicated.
1. Pakistan could gain a new strategic opening: For decades, India's geographic position effectively limited Pakistan's ability to exert influence on Bangladesh. A deeper Pakistan-Bangladesh military relationship could change that. It could give Islamabad greater access to Bangladesh's defence establishment, military exchanges and potentially the country's strategic geography.
2. China's role could become more important: Pakistan and Bangladesh already have significant defence relationships with China. A closer Pakistan-Bangladesh security relationship could therefore create an overlapping network involving China, Pakistan and Bangladesh. That does not automatically mean a formal anti-India bloc. But it could reduce India's strategic influence in its immediate eastern neighbourhood.
3. The maritime dimension matters: Bangladesh's location gives it access to the Bay of Bengal and the wider Indian Ocean. Pakistan and Türkiye have also been discussing maritime defence cooperation, while Saudi Arabia has been working on protecting regional shipping and energy routes. A Bangladesh connection could eventually add a maritime dimension to the emerging security network.
For India, which regards the Bay of Bengal as critical to its eastern maritime strategy, this would merit close monitoring.
Does this mean Bangladesh is becoming a headache for India? Not yet.
Bangladesh has repeatedly emphasised a policy of strategic balancing rather than choosing one major power over another. The current government is simultaneously trying to maintain working relations with India, Pakistan, China, Saudi Arabia and other partners.
India-Bangladesh ties are already under strain
The timing is significant. Relations between New Delhi and Dhaka have deteriorated since Hasina's removal. Bangladesh has sought her extradition from India, while New Delhi has been dealing with the political and security consequences of her presence in India.
At the same time, both countries have been discussing ways to repair ties. Against this backdrop, Dhaka's openness to a Pakistan-linked defence framework sends a clear strategic message: Bangladesh does not want its foreign policy to be dependent on any single neighbour.
The most important change may not be Bangladesh joining the Mecca Pact itself. It is the emergence of a new South Asian reality in which old alignments are being reconsidered.