Iran pursuing ‘asymmetric endurance’ strategy as IRGC leadership shifts: Ex-CIA officer
Former CIA officer Michael D. Sellers said that by the third day of the Iran-US-Israel conflict, Iran’s wartime strategy had started to become visible. In his view, Tehran understands it cannot match the combined military power of the United States and Israel directly.
- Mar 4, 2026,
- Updated Mar 4, 2026 4:56 PM IST
Former CIA officer Michael D. Sellers says Iran appears to be adopting what he describes as an “asymmetric endurance” strategy in the ongoing conflict with the United States and Israel. According to Sellers, the approach suggests Tehran is preparing for a long confrontation rather than seeking a quick settlement.
Sellers, in a column, said that by the third day of the Iran-US-Israel conflict, Iran’s wartime strategy had started to become visible. In his view, Tehran understands it cannot match the combined military power of the United States and Israel directly. Instead, he said, Iran may try to stretch the conflict over time, widen the battlefield and increase the political and economic costs for its opponents.
Asymmetric endurance
According to Sellers, the idea behind “asymmetric endurance” is simple: absorb early damage while preserving the ability to escalate later. He said Iran may attempt to wait for moments when U.S., Israeli and regional air defence systems become stretched or when interceptor supplies become limited.
He further argued that the strategy also has a strong political element. He said Tehran may be betting that rising costs — including higher oil prices, economic pressure and risks to U.S. forces in the region — could eventually force Washington to reconsider a prolonged war.
Iran’s strategy
In practical terms, Sellers said Iran’s strategy likely involves expanding the conflict beyond its own territory. He said this could include targeting or threatening energy infrastructure, shipping routes, air traffic and military bases across the Gulf region in order to create wider economic disruption.
According to Sellers, Iran may also try to exploit what he called “cost asymmetry.” He explained that cheaper drones and missiles could be used to force adversaries to deploy far more expensive air defence interceptors, gradually increasing the financial burden on the opposing side.
Sellers compared the strategy to a “rope-a-dope” approach, where a weaker fighter absorbs early blows while waiting for the opponent to tire. He said the concept is risky but recognisable: survive the early phase of the conflict and then look for opportunities as political and military pressures build on the other side.
Appointment of Ahmad Vahidi
Sellers also pointed to Iran’s reported appointment of Ahmad Vahidi as the new head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as an important signal. He said Vahidi is widely known as a long-time hardliner within Iran’s security establishment and is internationally wanted over alleged links to the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires.
According to Sellers, placing a hardline figure in charge of the IRGC suggests that Iran’s leadership is prioritising internal control, continuity and long-term confrontation rather than signalling a willingness to soften its position.
Sellers said the current signals from Tehran do not indicate an immediate shift toward reconciliation with the West. Instead, he believes Iran’s leadership appears focused on survival, endurance and raising the costs of the conflict for its adversaries.
However, Sellers noted that the success of this strategy depends on whether Iran can maintain internal stability. He said the key question in the coming days is whether military pressure could trigger internal fractures within Iran’s leadership, security forces or public order.
“If the regime holds together,” Sellers said, Iran’s strategy is essentially a wager: make the conflict long, make it costly and make it politically difficult for the United States and Israel to sustain.
Former CIA officer Michael D. Sellers says Iran appears to be adopting what he describes as an “asymmetric endurance” strategy in the ongoing conflict with the United States and Israel. According to Sellers, the approach suggests Tehran is preparing for a long confrontation rather than seeking a quick settlement.
Sellers, in a column, said that by the third day of the Iran-US-Israel conflict, Iran’s wartime strategy had started to become visible. In his view, Tehran understands it cannot match the combined military power of the United States and Israel directly. Instead, he said, Iran may try to stretch the conflict over time, widen the battlefield and increase the political and economic costs for its opponents.
Asymmetric endurance
According to Sellers, the idea behind “asymmetric endurance” is simple: absorb early damage while preserving the ability to escalate later. He said Iran may attempt to wait for moments when U.S., Israeli and regional air defence systems become stretched or when interceptor supplies become limited.
He further argued that the strategy also has a strong political element. He said Tehran may be betting that rising costs — including higher oil prices, economic pressure and risks to U.S. forces in the region — could eventually force Washington to reconsider a prolonged war.
Iran’s strategy
In practical terms, Sellers said Iran’s strategy likely involves expanding the conflict beyond its own territory. He said this could include targeting or threatening energy infrastructure, shipping routes, air traffic and military bases across the Gulf region in order to create wider economic disruption.
According to Sellers, Iran may also try to exploit what he called “cost asymmetry.” He explained that cheaper drones and missiles could be used to force adversaries to deploy far more expensive air defence interceptors, gradually increasing the financial burden on the opposing side.
Sellers compared the strategy to a “rope-a-dope” approach, where a weaker fighter absorbs early blows while waiting for the opponent to tire. He said the concept is risky but recognisable: survive the early phase of the conflict and then look for opportunities as political and military pressures build on the other side.
Appointment of Ahmad Vahidi
Sellers also pointed to Iran’s reported appointment of Ahmad Vahidi as the new head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as an important signal. He said Vahidi is widely known as a long-time hardliner within Iran’s security establishment and is internationally wanted over alleged links to the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires.
According to Sellers, placing a hardline figure in charge of the IRGC suggests that Iran’s leadership is prioritising internal control, continuity and long-term confrontation rather than signalling a willingness to soften its position.
Sellers said the current signals from Tehran do not indicate an immediate shift toward reconciliation with the West. Instead, he believes Iran’s leadership appears focused on survival, endurance and raising the costs of the conflict for its adversaries.
However, Sellers noted that the success of this strategy depends on whether Iran can maintain internal stability. He said the key question in the coming days is whether military pressure could trigger internal fractures within Iran’s leadership, security forces or public order.
“If the regime holds together,” Sellers said, Iran’s strategy is essentially a wager: make the conflict long, make it costly and make it politically difficult for the United States and Israel to sustain.