'Politicians talk like this only, it's for the military to infer': Ex-General on PM's instruction to Naravane

A former army general has interpreted Prime Minister Narendra Modi's "Jo uchit samjho, woh karo" instruction to former Army Chief General M M Naravane. 

The instruction, as recounted in Naravane's unpublished memoir, was given in August 2020, when Chinese tanks were advancing toward Indian positions at Rechin La on the Kailash Heights during the India-China standoff.

According to Naravane's account, the Chinese advance prompted him to seek urgent guidance from Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, who spoke to Prime Minister Modi. Singh then conveyed the Prime Minister's instruction to Naravane, which was: "Jo uchit samjho, woh karo (do whatever you deem appropriate)"

"I had been handed a hot potato," Naravane wrote, according to an article published earlier this month. "With this carte blanche, the onus was now totally on me."

The passage has triggered criticism from Congress. Rahul Gandhi and other leaders have accused the Centre and the Prime Minister of abdicating responsibility by not issuing clear-cut instructions.

Former Lieutenant General Raj Shukla has now offered his interpretation of the phrase and what it signifies in the political-military context.

"It starts with a cultural issue. I am from UP. If you tell me - jo uchit samjhe, wo karen. What do I interpret? I will say the politician is telling the military man that I know nothing of this stuff. I respect your professional wisdom. You do what you think is appropriate, and I will stand by you," the former commander said during a panel discussion at NDTV. "And what else does the politician say? He's not going to tell you in phase one you do this, in phase two you do this."

Shukla then cited former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's instructions to then General S Padmanabhan. General Padmanabhan led the Indian Army during the crucial period of 'Operation Parakram'.  

"General Padmanabhan said that when Mr Vajpayee gave him the orders for Operation Parakram, and he asked: 'What are my specific orders?' He said - aap chaliye, hum batayenge (you go, we will let you know). Now that is the way the politician speaks. The art of generalship lies in inferring this, and therefore it is an area of ambiguity. It requires careful calibration and trust."

Referring to the 1971 war, Shukla cited the example of Lieutenant General  Sagat Singh to underline the risks that come with operational decisions. 

"If I may just go back now to 1971. There's an outstanding guy whom we don't debate, Sagat Singh - one of the best Corps Commanders we've ever had. General Aurora, knowing Sagat, tells him, 'Sagat, when you reach the Meghna (river) or if you reach the Meghna first, you will not cross him. Sagat says, yes sir. But when Sagat reaches the Meghna, General Aurora rings him up and tells Sagat, 'You have reached the Meghna, you remember what I told you.' And Sagat turns around and says sir 'I'm a corps commander. I see opportunity across and Dhaka beyond. I'm crossing at 5:00 a.m. tomorrow. Now, if that operation had not succeeded, he would have been court-martialled. But that had succeeded, we created a new geopolitical reality."

Shukla, however, said that General Naravane has raised some valid points. "This China study group has outlived its utility. Now that the CDS has been formed, the chain of command must flow either from the political leadership to the theater commander - and that was the whole purpose of theater commands so as to reduce these bureaucratic layers -  or from the political leadership to the CDS and the theater commanders." 

The former commander said that the China study group is good for peace-time confabulations. But he also stressed that these issues cannot be left to the military. Shukla then referred to the Kargil Review Committee, which was authored by K Subrahmanyam, father of EAM S Jaishankar. 

"What a brilliant mind. When he (Subrahmanyam) spoke of theater commands and the DIA (Defence Intelligence Agency). The DIA was created because he wanted the military to take its gaze beyond the LAC - look beyond, shape your environment, what you call hemispheric influence. These deep issues of higher defense organisation need to be debated by civilians. Militaries have never reformed on their own. They need this civilian intellectualism to push them to reform."