
Former Indian Air Force officer Ajay Ahlawat on Wednesday hit back at Pakistan's former Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto over claims that the Pakistan Air Force had locked onto 20 Indian jets and shot down six during Operation Sindoor. Rejecting the assertion, Ahlawat said the PAF could carry out some launches on the first night due to restrictive rules of engagement for the IAF, and once those were lifted, "PAF couldn't find a place to hide."
"If they were able to lock 20 and shoot 6 on 7th, that too having identified the strikers from the rest, why couldn't they shoot the strikers on 9th and 10th," the officer said, referring to the Indian strikes in the subsequent two days that Pakistan could not intercept. "They could launch their BVRs in spray-and-pray mode at large distances, without inviting a meteor in return, only coz of very restrictive RoE for IAF on the first night. When the restrictions were lifted PAF couldn't find a place to hide."
The former officer also defended India's losses, saying air superiority comes at a cost. He described losses in combat as an inevitable part of high-stakes air warfare. "When you wish to command the skies over the battlespace; you also expect blood in the clouds- air superiority is paid for in wreckages. In the furnace of air warfare, attrition isn’t failure- it’s the price of pushing through the hellfire."
Ahlawat's remarks come amid a debate over India's losses during Operation Sindoor, which he described as a 'resounding success'. Earlier this week, Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan admitted that India did suffer some aircraft losses in the early stages of the operation.
Ahlawat, in an opinion piece in The Print, sought to put those losses in the correct strategic context, arguing that attrition is not uncommon in the opening hours of a contested air campaign against a well-prepared adversary. He also said that PAF had failed to provide any evidence - that it downed six jets - other than a sleazy presentation and social media posts.
The Chinese-made PL15 BVR missile, which Pakistan credits for all the alleged kills, was found "almost intact in our territory," the officer said. He questioned the missile's credibility, saying, "A missile that fails to self-destruct at the end of its cruise phase is certainly not the 'best in the world' as claimed by our adversary."
Ahlawat stressed that the IAF's early missions were flown under severe limitations. "Our strikers were operating under very restrictive rules of engagement, against an adversary that was pre-warned and well-armed." With no SEAD or DEAD missions permitted, political directives had limited the strikes to non-military terror infrastructure, stripping the IAF of key tactical advantages.
He further noted that once India lifted restrictions and adapted its strategy, the tables turned. Rafale and BrahMos-armed Su-30s carried out precision strikes on 8/9 May. Combat air patrols continued round the clock, and surface-to-air missile systems were placed on high alert, with SEAD/DEAD missions following soon after. The turning point came on 10 May, when Pakistan launched Operation Bunyan al-Marsoos. In response, the IAF struck multiple targets across Pakistan, releasing satellite-proofed destruction.
"The much-touted J10C and PL15 combo failed to bring down any of our jets. These aircraft were operating deep inside Pakistan’s airspace and failed to launch even a single BVR," Ahlawat noted. He said India's updated tactics and electronic warfare capabilities neutralised the PAF's earlier edge.
Ahlawat also drew a parallel with the 1973 Yom Kippur War, where even the technologically superior Israeli Air Force suffered significant losses in the first few hours—thirty A-4s, six Phantoms, and four Super Mystères. "In a war, you count your wins by counting missions that were successful and not by counting damaged assets," he concluded.