Roads, tunnels and airbases: India’s post-Galwan clashes strategy to deter China

India is spending hundreds of millions of dollars to carve roads, tunnels and airstrips through the unforgiving Himalayas, dramatically reshaping its military posture along the disputed frontier with China as New Delhi prepares for the possibility of future confrontation with its most formidable strategic rival. 

The push follows the deadly 2020 standoff in eastern Ladakh, when Indian and Chinese troops clashed in the Galwan Valley — the first lethal encounter along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in more than four decades. At least 20 Indian soldiers were killed in hand-to-hand combat involving clubs, stones and barbed-wire implements, while China later acknowledged casualties on its side, though it did not disclose numbers. The violence put aside decades of confidence-building measures that had kept firearms off the border and underscored the volatility of the poorly defined 2,200-mile frontier. 

The Galwan clash exposed a stark reality for Indian military planners: while China had spent years building a dense network of roads, railways and logistics hubs across Tibet and Xinjiang, India struggled to move troops, artillery and supplies across its own mountainous terrain, according to a report by The Wall Street Journal.

According to analysts cited by The Wall Street Journal, China could mobilise reinforcements to the LAC within hours, while India often needed days — sometimes up to a week — due to limited connectivity and treacherous terrain. 

“It was a dramatic shift in thinking … we realised we needed to change our total approach,” WSJ quoted Major General Amrit Pal Singh, former chief of operational logistics in Ladakh, as saying. 

Since then, New Delhi has launched an aggressive infrastructure drive across the Himalayan belt. Among the most ambitious projects is the over $750-million Zojila tunnel, being built at an altitude of around 11,500 feet. Construction began months after the Galwan clash, and once completed, the tunnel is expected to provide all-weather access to Ladakh, a region that can remain cut off for up to six months each year due to heavy snowfall. 

Yet even with improved connectivity, sustaining troops at extreme altitudes remains a punishing logistical challenge. Supplies are transported by truck and rail to depots in Jammu and Kashmir before being ferried in convoys to Leh. Beyond that, smaller vehicles navigate broken mountain tracks, and the final stretches — at heights approaching 20,000 feet — are often covered by porters and pack animals. 

“It’s a massive, massive logistical exercise undertaken regularly every year,” Lt Gen Deependra Singh Hooda, former Northern Army commander, told WSJ. Each soldier, he noted, requires roughly 220 pounds of supplies every month, while a small forward post can consume about 13 gallons of fuel a day. “That has to be brought up to that post on somebody’s shoulder.” 

India has also rapidly expanded air connectivity along the LAC. More than 30 helipads have been built, while several airstrips have been upgraded or newly constructed. One key addition is the Mudh-Nyoma airbase in Ladakh, located nearly 14,000 feet above sea level and just 19 miles from the Chinese border, capable of handling heavier transport aircraft such as the C-130J. 

The infrastructure build-up comes as tensions persist not just in Ladakh but also along the eastern sector of the LAC in Arunachal Pradesh. In recent years, troops from both sides have engaged in multiple face-offs in areas such as Tawang, where a clash in December 2022 left soldiers injured after Chinese troops attempted to unilaterally alter the status quo. India has repeatedly rejected Beijing’s claims over Arunachal Pradesh, which China refers to as “South Tibet,” and has accused the People’s Liberation Army of frequent transgressions and aggressive patrols. 

These flashpoints have reinforced New Delhi’s urgency to strengthen border infrastructure in the eastern Himalayas, where rugged terrain and sparse connectivity pose challenges similar to those exposed during the Ladakh crisis. 

Daniel Markey, senior fellow at the Stimson Center, told WSJ that India had previously “rolled out the red carpet” to a potential Chinese incursion, as older strategic thinking held that building roads near the border could actually aid an invading force. That mindset began to change in the mid-2000s as China accelerated infrastructure development in Tibet and Xinjiang, dramatically narrowing response times. 

Still, the push is not without risks. Analysts warn that expanded roads, patrols and forward deployments could heighten the chances of friction, particularly in sensitive areas like Pangong Tso, where both sides continue to maintain a presence despite partial disengagement agreements. 

Indian officials, however, argue the strategy is defensive rather than escalatory. “We’re not going overboard,” WSJ quoted Singh as saying, framing the infrastructure surge as a long-overdue effort to close a critical gap and reinforce deterrence along one of the world’s most contested borders.