'End HAL's monopoly': Ex-Navy officer on why India can't build AMCA with one gatekeeper

India's Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) programme is more than a design challenge — it's a test of whether the country is ready to move beyond a state-run monopoly in defence manufacturing.

Sudhir Pillai, former Flag Officer Naval Aviation of the Indian Navy, says the real question now is not if India can build AMCA, but who should be allowed to.

"India is preparing to launch its most ambitious aerospace programme yet, the fifth-generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft. The challenge is no longer just designing the AMCA; it is choosing who should build it," Pillai writes in ThePrint.

He takes aim at HAL Chairman DK Sunil's recent statement that India doesn't need a second fighter jet integrator. "It reveals the institutional mindset of India's largest defence PSU and its resistance to competitive integration… Sunil's central claim… should not be mistaken for strategic realism. It is, instead, a warning bell."

"At stake is not just another fighter jet, but India's pathway to building a globally competitive, innovation-driven defence aerospace ecosystem. And that journey cannot proceed if HAL remains both gatekeeper and default beneficiary, while the Ministry of Defence (MoD) continues to play the role of a passive monopsonist," he adds.

Pillai compared this with China's diversified fighter ecosystem—J-10, J-16, J-20, J-35—and Pakistan's co-development of the JF-17 and outreach to Turkey's TAI. He argues India's overreliance on HAL is outdated. 

"Despite its scale, HAL functions more like an industrial arm of the Indian government than a true ‘prime-contractor’…HAL remains a delivery node within a protected procurement pipeline, not a market-facing, innovation-driven aerospace prime."

On the Rafale deal, he notes: "Dassault, selected to supply 126 Rafales, refused to accept HAL as a license producer without control over production quality and timelines...Even trusted partners hesitate to rely on HAL for complex fighter integration, not due to malice, but due to structural inefficiencies."

He rejects the argument that AMCA, Tejas Mk1A, and Mk2 volumes don't justify a second integrator. He said this "rests on flawed arithmetic". "It reduces the strategic rationale for diversification to a question of volume, ignoring the more profound truth: competition builds resilience, not redundancy."

Pillai notes most global powers have multiple aerospace primes. "The US supports Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Northrop Grumman. France has Dassault and Airbus. Israel promotes IAI, Rafael, and Elbit. South Korea has KAI. Turkey is advancing the TF-X through TAI."

“These examples reflect the strategic dividends of diversified industrial capacity and risk-sharing.”

India almost chose this path in the 1980s, he recalls, when DRDO proposed a PPP-led LCA involving Tata and Commodore Arogyaswami Paulraj—but the plan was shelved.

In 2023–24, the MoD invited Tata, L&T, Adani, and Bharat Forge to compete for AMCA integration, with ADA retaining design authority. But HAL pushed back. "HAL's reaction, including public complaints about scoring 'zero out of 100’, suggests it is resisting this opening… It wants to reassert its gatekeeping role, which is not a sign of confidence, but of institutionalised privilege."

On HAL's ecosystem claims, Pillai is clear: "That's subcontracting, not ecosystem development."

He proposes key reforms: "End HAL’s integration monopoly: Select the AMCA integrator on merit, not entitlement. Empower ADA/NFTC… Create a joint venture/SPV with ADA, GE Aerospace, and the selected integrator."

ADA's monopoly too, he says, must be scrutinised. "India needs similar mechanisms to push ADA toward open, iterative design practices."

AMCA is being developed as India's first indigenous fifth-generation stealth fighter by DRDO in collaboration with HAL and private sector partners. The program is currently in the detailed design phase with prototype development expected by the end of this decade.