The shipment had been bound for Hodeida, a Red Sea port controlled by the Houthis. Yemeni authorities seized the first container in October last year after receiving a tip from US intelligence. The containers were inspected in July at the request of the United Nations Panel of Experts.
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From Chinese factories to Houthi workshops
According to the report, the cargo included rear fins and other parts resembling components used to assemble an Iranian ballistic missile. Investigators also found phenolic resin, a heat-resistant material used in missile production.
The other containers contained control systems, launch equipment, drone engines, and machines capable of producing precision parts for missiles and drones.
Fawaz Al Bsesi, director general of Aden's Land, Sea and Air Ports Department, said the components appeared to have been deliberately split across four containers to make them harder to detect.
"I came across a complete missile structure distributed among the three containers," Al Bsesi wrote to his superiors.
Weapons experts said some of the items had legitimate civilian uses. But taken together, they pointed to a military supply chain. "Some items are almost certainly components of missiles, others are much more ambiguous," said Henry Thompson, an arms expert and former member of the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen.
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China at the centre of supply network
Shipping records reviewed by Bloomberg show a growing network linking Chinese exporters with cargo headed towards Houthi-controlled Yemen. Dozens of containers this year were shipped under 41 bills of lading, many from exporters based in Guangzhou.
In 25 cases, the Yemeni importer listed on the shipping documents was changed while the cargo was in transit. Aden authorities said the changes were intended to hide the Houthi-linked companies behind the shipments.
Yemeni merchants have long travelled to Guangzhou for cheap goods. After the civil war began and the Houthis seized Sana’a in 2014, those commercial ties expanded.
Those networks gave Houthi-linked buyers access to Chinese factories and brokers. An engine could come from one supplier, electronics from another, and the components could then be assembled into weapons in Yemen.
According to the report, Peter Salisbury, a Columbia University adjunct professor who led a report on Houthi weapons manufacturing, said Chinese manufacturers can now produce drone components at lower prices than Western suppliers.
The Houthis can also find many components through commercial marketplaces. Engines, GPS units, flight controllers, batteries, and other parts used in drones are available on platforms such as Alibaba and AliExpress.
The report said that the Houthis buy in bulk via a Yemeni network, but much of what's needed to build a Qasef 2-K drone can also be bought via the Chinese e-commerce conglomerate, Alibaba, in just a few clicks.
The UN verification system at Djibouti can inspect commercial cargo but cannot seize goods. A UN spokesperson, cited in the report, said Chinese dual-use goods reaching the Houthis were outside the system’s mandate.
Bloomberg report further stated that at a UN Security Council meeting on July 14, the US, citing a UN agency that monitors shipments into Yemen, said that "more than 70% of the prohibited or restricted dual-use items seized between January 2025 and April 2026 originated in China."