India’s participation in these overlapping platforms reflects the post-1991 shift from non-alignment towards strategic autonomy and issue-based multi-alignment. Rather than joining a fixed geopolitical bloc, New Delhi works simultaneously with countries that may have competing strategic interests.
The Quad, comprising India, the US, Japan and Australia, provides a platform for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, including maritime security, resilient supply chains, technology and public goods. At the same time, India remains part of the SCO, where China and Russia play central roles and where New Delhi pursues interests including counter-terrorism and engagement with Central Asia.
BRICS provides another avenue for India to work with emerging and developing economies on issues including global governance, finance and economic cooperation, while the G20 remains a key forum for global economic governance. India chaired the G20 in 2023 and used its presidency to emphasise the interests of the Global South.
A portfolio of strategic interests
The logic behind this overlapping membership is increasingly important as the global system becomes more fragmented and multipolar. Each grouping serves a different Indian interest rather than representing a single strategic alignment.
The SCO gives India a presence in the Eurasian security architecture, while the Quad strengthens its Indo-Pacific partnerships. BRICS provides a platform for greater representation of developing economies, and the G20 gives India a seat at the highest level of global economic decision-making.
Other groupings extend India's reach further. BIMSTEC and IORA reinforce its neighbourhood and Indian Ocean priorities, while I2U2 and IMEC deepen engagement with the Middle East and Europe. The International Solar Alliance and Global Biofuels Alliance extend India's influence into climate and energy cooperation.
India at the centre
The infographic shows the contrast with other major powers. India belongs to all 12 groupings, compared with six each for the US, Japan and Australia, five each for Indonesia and the UAE, and four each for China, Russia, France and Brazil.
The breadth of India's participation illustrates its attempt to work with competing power centres without becoming dependent on any one of them. In an increasingly multipolar order, these overlapping partnerships have become instruments of strategic autonomy—and a means for India to convert its growing economic and geopolitical weight into greater influence.